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Greening the Reds or Reddening the Greens?  




Since the late 1960s party systems in most West European countries have gone through 
changes - not as cataclysmic as recently in Eastern Europe, of course, but more substantial 
than in many previous decades. While several old political issues lost salience, new problems 
gained a prominent place on the agenda: above all, the pollution of the environment and the 
question of energy resources, but also the quality of democracy, the emancipation of women, 
immigrants and individual rights. Whilst some established parties took on the new issues and 
tried to aggregate them with older, material interests, new parties emerged to articulate the 
new, 'post-materialist' demands in practically every country in Western Europe. Two stages 
can be distinguished here: the 1960s, and the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1960s, libertarian 
socialist and radical parties were founded, often by dissidents from established parties, who 
strove for a New Left which would articulate the new issues without completely neglecting 
the old ones. In the 1970s and 1980s, green parties sprang up to bring the environmental crisi 
to the fore; though also libertanian (that is, critical of the state and anxious to preserve 
individual liberty and autonomy), they tended to place themselves ‘beyond left and right’. 
Like the older parties, the green parties have to face aggregation problems, however, 
integrating for instance economic and foreign policy issues in their ideological framework. 
 Five scenarios seem logically possible: 
1. Established parties – whether right wing, Old Left or New Left – adapt themselves 
succesfully, adding a touch of green to their own colour; ‘pure green’ parties fail 
to  penetrate the party system and remain marginal. Hence the party system will 
change very little; the traditional cleavages retain their predominance. 
2. Green parties penetrate the system successfully, adopting leftis positions with 
respect to ‘old’ issues: socialism or reliance on state intervention. As a result, they 
are pushed or pulled – willingly or unwillingly – to the extreme left of the 
political spectrum. Thus, the emergence of the new party would not introduce a 
new dimension into the party system. Left continues to mean ‘socialist’ or state 
interventionist, whereas right signifies ‘conservative’ or ‘laissez-faire liberal’. 
3. Green parties conques a position in the party system close to the centre; they may 
deny the traditional left-right dimension with limited success: the new 
‘green/grey’ cleavage they try to create remains much weaker than the old 
cleavages based on class or religion. 
4.  Green parties could turn eco-fascist and identify with the (extreme) right; as a 
result they would not add a new dimension to the party system - the counterpart of 
the second option. 
5. Green parties gain a foothold while remaining ‘pure green’, ‘neither left nor 
right’, developing a ‘third way’ beyond socialism and capitalism. Thus, they will 
add a new dimension to the partysytem, ‘ecology versus economy’ or ‘green 
versus grey’, with cross-cuts the traditional left-right dimension. 
 
 A survey of the literature suggests that the first scenario option has been followed in 
Denmark and Norway, where the new leftist Socialist People's parties turned green and 
prevented new green parties from winning any seats (Müller-Rommel, 1984; Schüttemeyer, 
1989; Logue, 1982). The second option has been taken by the Greens in Germany, if one 
ignores the marginal Oekologische Demokratische Partei. The Communist party of Germany 
had remained rather orthodox Old Leftist and lost significance; while the New Left 
movement did not penetrate the party system in the 1960s, but seems to have created a 
fruitful subcultural ‘hotbed’ for Die Grünen (Langner 1987, pp. 31-59, 81-7; Müller-Rommel 
1985; Van Haren 1991). The third scenario could be found - with some qualifications - in 
Sweden and France (Vedung 1989, 1988; Prendiville 1989). In both countries, strong 
communist parties fill the extreme left of the spectrum, leaving the Greens’ position near the 
centre. The fourth option exists only on paper, as far as we know. Many rightwing extremist 
parties may be new, but not green: they mobilize voters on the (relatively new) issue of 
immigration and pay at best lip-service to the environment, rather than advocate 'eco-
fascism'. The fifth option seems characteristic of the fragmented, open party system of 
Switzerland, where 'pure green' parties compete with 'eco-socialists' and 'alternative-green' 
parties (Ladner 1989; Kreuzer 1990; Finger and Sciarini 1991).  
 At first side, the Dutch Green Left should be classified under the second option: the 
party calls itself left wing; while the pure green Groenen have remained marginal (Voerman 
1991). Yet, at second sight, the situation looks more complicated, especially if one looks at 
the history of the Green Left, which resulted from a merger of four smaller parties in 1990. 
One of them, the Political Party of Radicals (PPR), founded in 1968, can be considered one 
of the oldest 'new parties' in the world, though it did not call itself 'green' or 'ecologist' until 
the 1980s. Almost as new and green, however, appeared New Leftist Pacifist Socialist Party 
(PSP), founded in 1957. In 1990 these two parties merged with a small Christian group and 
the old Communist Party into Groen Links (Green Left, GL). In this chapter, we shall try to 
explain this rapprochement between 'reds' and 'greens' in The Netherlands - a process which 
may occur in other countries as well, even if it does not end in a complete merger. We shall 
consider historical-political as well as sociological explanations. 
 Too many studies of green parties have neglected the historical and political context 
of the countries concerned (see Lowe and Rüdig1986). Hence, the next section of the chapter 
contains a brief survey of the history of the Green Left and its precursors in the context of the 
Dutch party system. In the third section, some data will be presented from surveys held at the 
final party conventions of the four parties which merged into Green Left. The fourth section 
offers a rather tentative explanation of the birth of the new party; but the reader should be 
warned, the explanation will be complicated and possibly confusing! 
 
History of the Green Left 
  
The Dutch party system has always been segmented or pillarised. A secular-religious 
cleavage cross-cut the cleavage between classes. Religious or confessional parties, Catholic 
as well as Protestant, held a (narrow) majority in parliament until the 1960s. The Catholic 
party as well as the major Protestant parties were almost always certain of a share of 
government power, but alternated left-wing and right-wing coalition partners: the Social 
Democrats (since 1946: PvdA – Partij van de Arbeid, Labour Party) or the Conservative 
Liberals (since 1948: VVD, Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie).  
 Between 1946 and 1959 the Social Democrats played a leading role in a coalition 
government, which laid the foundations for the corporatist Dutch welfare state and ended the 
Dutch tradition of neutrality by joining NATO and admitting American nuclear arms on 
Dutch soil. Both policies met with opposition from the Communist Party of the Netherlands 
(CPN). In 1946 the CPN enjoyed a good reputation because of its resistance against the 
German occupation (1940-5) and its connections with Soviet Russia. Before the end of the 
decade, however, these connections turned from assets into liabilities when the cold war 
broke out. Between 1946 and 1959 the Communists lost three quarters of their electorate; 
their share of the popular vote dropped from 10.6 per cent to 2.4 per cent. Even so, the 
leadership did not waver in its loyalty to the Soviet Union - at least not until 1963, when it 
refused to take sides in the quarrel between Russian and Chinese Communists. But even in 
the 1960s and 1970s it maintained its identification with the Soviet model and the bloc of (so-
called) socialist states. For pacifists and radical socialists, the 1950s were hard times: they 
felt betrayed by the Social Democrats - who had been neutralists and often also pacifists 
before 1940 - and repelled by the Communists. In 1957, this 'homeless group' founded the 
Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP). It was a motley crowd of Tolstoyan Christians, libertarian 
socialists and left-wing social democrats (Van der Land 1962). In the 1960s and early 1970s, 
conflicts between various tendencies led to party splits and loss of support; but eventually an 
ideological consensus developed around ideas about non-violent defence, socialisation of 
private corporations under workers' control and emancipation of the individual from 
traditional (bourgeois) norms and roles (PSP 1982; Lucardie 1980).  
 Like other New Left parties, the PSP distrusted the (liberal-corporatist) state; 
socialism had to be built 'from below', in direct action at the grass-roots, at work, in school, 
on the street; parliament might play a secondary role. Hence the party lent support to any 
social movement that opposed capitalism and the state. Since the late 1960s, Pacifist 
Socialists took part in actions against pollution and - a little later - against nuclear power. 
Women's liberation could also count on sympathy (Brinkman, Freriks and Voerman 1990). 
Feminism was adopted as a source of ideological inspiration (in 1980); ecologism did not 
receive quite the same favor. Most important was the peace movement - not surprising, in the 
case of a pacifist party. To some extent, the electorate of the PSP fluctuated with the size of 
the peace movement: up in the early 1960s, down in the 1970s, up again in the early 1980s. 
Peaks were reached in 1981 and 1983, when several hundred thousand people marched 
against the deployment of cruise missiles on Dutch soil through the streets of Amsterdam and 
The Hague respectively. It has been estimated that about half of the citizens who had voted 
for the PSP in 1981 actually took part in the peace march the same year (Schennink, Bertrand 
and Fun 1982, p40). 
 Yet the Pacifist Socialists did not monopolise the peace movement, but rubbed 
shoulders with Social Democrats, Communists and committed Christians on the streets of 
Amsterdam and The Hague. Some of those Christians voted for the Christian Democratic 
Appeal (CDA), the party into which the Catholic party and the largest Protestant parties had 
merged in 1980; but others had deserted the confessional fold. The left wing of the Catholic 
party had already broken away in 1968 and founded the Political Party of Radicals (PPR). At 
first, the PPR tried to be a left-wing Christian party, wooing the Catholic and Protestant 
trade-unions. These attempts failed; the new party attracted middle-class intellectuals, social 
workers, school teachers and professionals - 'the partisans of the poor' rather than the poor 
themselves (Van Ginneken 1976). Gradually, the party became more secular and more 
leftwing, in a New Left direction; yet the term 'socialism' remained taboo. Rather than 
defining its ideology, the Radical party emphasised issues: peace, environment, welfare and 
democratisation (of social and economic institutions). In the 1970s it sought co-operation 
with the also somewhat libertarian Democrats 66 (D66) and the Labour Party, which steered 
a New Leftish course at the time. From 1973 to 1977 the PPR took part in a coalition 
government with D66, Labour and some of the Christian parties. After 1977 the gap between 
PPR and PvdA widened, causing a crisis within the Radical ranks. Many of the founders of 
the party began to leave (and join the PvdA); its electorate shrank (see Table 1) - as the party 
shifted towards the extreme left, in the eyes of the voters (Van der Eijk and Niemöller 1983, 
p. 250). In 1983 the rank and file discussed the future of the party in terms of colours: 'red' 
wanted to make an alliance with PSP and CPN; 'green' wanted to renew the PPR in a more 
ecologist direction; 'blue' wished to maintain the old, vaguely Christian identity and to stay 
close to Labour. None of the tendencies won a clear majority, but 'red' and 'green' reached a 
compromise. The party defined its identity in the following terms: 'radical, solidary, non-
conformist, libertarian and ecologist' (PPR 1983). 
 In the early 1980s, the Radicals took part in a Green Platform, but were also involved 
in local and provincial electoral alliances with Pacifist Socialists and Communists (Voerman 
1990a). The Green Platform fell apart within a few years; some of its members set up a new 
green party, called De Groenen (The Greens) since 1988 - but with only marginal 
membership. The alliance between PPR, PSP and CPN proved more promising: at the 
elections for the European parliament in 1984, their 'Green Progressive Accord' won 5.6 per 
cent of the vote, enough for two seats. In 1979, the three parties had presented separate lists 
and failed to win any seats at all.  
 
Table 1 Election results of green left parties, 1959-1989  (Parliamentary elections only) 
 
     CPN    PSP  PPR  EVP  total GL   
  %  seats %  seats %  seats %  seats %  seats 
1959    2.4     3 1.8 2   - - -   - 3.2  5 
1963  2.8 4 3.0 4   - - -   - 5.8  8 
1967  3.6 5 2.9 4   - - -   - 6.5  9 
1971  3.9 6 1.4 2 1.8 2 -   - 7.1 10 
1972  4.5 7 1.5 2 4.8 7 -    -     10.8 16  
1977  1.7 2 0.9 1 1.7 3 -   - 4.3  6 
1981  2.1 3 2.1 3 2.0 3 0.5 0 6.7  9 
1982  1.8 3 2.3 3 1.7 2 0.7 1 6.5  9 
1986  0.6 0 1.2 1 1.3 2 0.2 0 3.3  3 
1989   - -  -  -    - - -   - 4.1  6 
Source: Documentation Centre on Dutch Political Parties 
 
 The issue of co-operation had come up for consideration because of the heavy electoral 
setbacks of the three parties at the end of the seventies (see Table 1). It was thought that a 
joint list might stop the electoral decline and perhaps even attract more voters. Beside this 
electoral bonus it was conceived that a new united party might draw Labour more to the left. 
Collaboration of the parties was stimulated by the new social movements which came to the 
fore at that time: not only the peace movement, but also the environmental movement – 
which led the opposition against nuclear power – and the women’s movement, which fought 
for legalisation of abortion. Together with these movements PPR and PSP joined hands in 
extra-parliamentary actions. Party members came across each other in blockades of nuclear 
plants for instance, or later in the above mentioned large peace demonstrations (Schennink et 
al.1982; Van der Loo et al. 1984). As a result, old dividing lines between the activists tended 
to fade and consultations between the executives of PSP and PPR and the new social 
movements were institutionalized. Initially, the CPN acted independently and organised 
several actions on its own account. In the early 1980s, however, co-operation between 
Radicals, Pacifist Socialists and Communists got under way, facilitated by the ideological 
renewal of the latter. Electoral decline and rejuvenation of cadre had undermined the Marxist 
Leninist orthodoxy and discipline of the CPN. The old proletarian cadre was gradually 
replaced by young university graduates, social workers and journalists with New Left 
sympathies (Voerman 1990b). After intense debates, the party adopted a new programme in 
1984 which rejected Leninism and recognized feminism as a source of inspiration on equal 
footing with Marxism (Fennema 1988; Lucardie 1985). As a result, a group of orthodox 
Leninists left the party and founded the Verbond van Communisten in Nederland (VCN - 
Association of Communists in the Netherlands), which, however, has remained a marginal 
party.. It has to compete with two other Leninist parties, the Trotskyite Socialist Workers 
Party and the originally Maoist Socialist Party. Neither of them has seats in parliament, but 
the latter has achieved some successes in municipal elections. Communists had been willing 
to make 'progressive coalitions' with other parties long before 1984, provided they could act 
as 'vanguard'. Now they gave up this ambition - even democratic centralism was renounced -
and became acceptable to others (CPN 1984, pp. 11-16). Equally co-operative were the 
Radicals. Both wanted to include the PSP in an alliance for the parliamentary elections 
scheduled for 1986. The Pacifist Socialists, however, had second thoughts. Though they had 
approved of the 'Green Progressive Accord' at the European elections, they rejected a similar 
alliance at the national level (with a narrow majority of 51 per cent). Thus the three leftist 
parties presented separate lists at the elections - with disastrous results (see Table 1). Besides, 
the exodus of membership which had been going on for several years, continued (see Table 
2). 
 
Table 2  Membership of green left parties, 1971-1989 
  





































* Membership Green Left, consisting of membership of CPN, EVP, PSP and PPR and the 
direct members of the Green Left Association (1.100)  
Source: Documentation Centre for Dutch Political Parties 
 
As a consequence of the electoral defeat, the autonomist wing of the PSP lost its hegemony 
within the party; its hard core left the party. At last, the road had been cleared for the merger 
of the three small left-wing parties; even so, it took three more years, hard negotiations and 
internal quarrels before an agreement was reached about a common programme and list of 
candidates for the next parliamentary elections, held in 1989. Environmental issues figured 
prominently in the programme, but so did social issues like a more equal income distribution. 
Socialism was not mentioned. The election results of Green Left were not quite as good as 
expected, but good enough to stimulate further co-operation at local, provincial and national 
level. In 1990 the Green Left held its first party congress; in 1991, PSP, PPR and CPN held 
their last conventions and dissolved their organisations. A fourth party was included, too: the 
tiny Evangelical People's Party (Evangelische Volkspartij, EVP). In 1981 it had been set up 
by Protestants who regretted the merger of their (relatively) progressive Protestant party with 
the more conservative Catholics into the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA); as well as 
small groups of Christian Radicals who did not feel at home in the secular PPR. The 
programme of the EVP resembled that of the PPR regarding nuclear disarmament, 
environmental policies and redistribution of income and power; but was not as libertarian 
with respect to individual rights (abortion, euthanasia). In 1984 the EVP did not join the 
Green Progressive Accord - though some members did so à titre personnel - but in 1989 the 
dwindling number of party members decided in favor of joining the Green Left. In 1991 the 
party also dissolved itself, but maintained an Evangelical Forum within Green Left (Nieboer 
and Lucardie 1992). 
 The merger of the four small parties into one medium-sized party may fit in with a trend 
towards concentration in the Dutch party sytem. In 1980, two Protestant parties had merged 
with the Catholic Party into the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA). Several small parties, 
founded in the 1960s and 1970s, had disappeared by 1991. Fractionalisation in parliament 
declined between 1971 and 1991 from .84 to .74 (Rae Index, see Daalder 1987, p. 199). Even 
so, the Dutch party system has remained fairly fragmented. The largest party, the CDA, can 
count on about one-third of the electorate – but holds a pivotal position in the system. The 
Labour Party (PvdA) used to attract about one-quarter of the popular vote, the conservative-
liberal party (VVD) almost one-fifth, while the share of the left-wing Democrats 66 (D66) 
fluctuates betwee 5 and 15 per cent. These four parties are regarded as regierungsfähig, 
potential government parties. The small Protestant and secular parties of the extreme right as 
well as Green Left are generally considered permanent opposition parties with at most some 
indirect influence on the political agenda through the major parties they may try to pressurise. 
When the PvdA was moving towards the (New) Left, in the late 1960s and 1970s, it was 
fairly sensitive to this kind of pressure; but since 1981 the Labour Party has slowly shifted 
towards the centre and turned a cold shoulder to its left-wing neighbours. Their increasing 
isolation might have encouraged the small left-wing parties to seek more co-operation and 
comfort among themselves. 
 
The Green Left: an Empirical Survey 
 
With the full support and co-operation of the party executives, the authors of this chapter held 
surveys at the founding congress of Green Left (November 1990) and the last conventions of 
PSP (January 1991), PPR (February 1991), EVP (April 1991) and CPN (June 1991).1 
Questionnaires were distributed to party delegates (in the case of PPR, PSP and CPN) or 
party members, if the congress was open to all and delegation did not take place (GL, EVP). 
The questionnaires could be filled in and returned at the congress or by post. The response 
rates varied between around 60 per cent.2 In this chapter we focus on the data from the four 
party conventions; though we shall occasionally to the data from the Green Left congress 
(Lucardie et al. 1991).The questionnaire was designed with the following hypotheses in 
mind: 
1.  The merger was perceived as a step towards ideological renewal in a green direction, 
 though electoral (opportunistic) reasons may have played a role, too: united the parties 
 would survive and exercise some influence, divided they might disappear from the 
 electoral map. Yet one would expect the ‘greenest’ members to be the keenest on merging  
 into the Green Left, for ideological reasons. 
2. As New Left or left-libertarian parties tend to turn green, according to Kitschelt (1989), 
 Bürklin (1985), De Roo (1991) and others, one might expect the New Left parties PPR 
 and PSP to be 'greener' than the (originally) Old Left CPN; however, even the CPN must 
 have become 'green' to some extent, otherwise it would not have joined Green Left. 
3. Ideological convergence might imply a 'greening of the reds', but also a 'reddening of the 
 greens': PPR and possibly EVP might agree with CPN and PSP on nationalisation of 
 private business, the evil of NATO and preference for trade unions over organisations of 
 employers. Suppose, however, that we should not find any substantial ideological 
 convergence; what other explanations suggest themselves for the merger of ‘reds’ and 
 ‘greens’ in the Netherlands? 
4. Under ideological diversity might lie common values, 'post-materialism' as defined by 
 Inglehart (1977), that provide a cultural base for mutual understanding. 
5. The merging of the historically rather different parties could be facilitated by social 
 homogeneity; as predicted by Bürklin (1984, 1985), the cadre of the four parties (and the 
 Green Left) might consist predominantly of unemployed or underemployed university 
 graduates; or of non-productive public servants (Alber 1989; Cotgrove and Duff, 1980) or 
  'communicative workers', 'logocrats', social scientists and the like (Andersen, 1990; 
 Lucardie 1980). 
6. Generations might also have an important impact: whereas the older generation 
 Communists, Socialists and Christians kept thinking in terms of cold war and religious 
 cleavages, hence distrusting each other, the younger ones would be more open minded 
and  therefore more interested in a merger.  
7. Activists in the new social movements (environment, peace, women) would favor and 
 further the merger for short-term ends rather than ideological principles. 
 
Results 
Motivation: A substantial majority of all respondents agreed that the four parties would not 
survive separately (69 per cent). Of members of EVP and CPN this agreement is not 
surprising, given the fact that their parties had lost their seats in parliament in 1986; but even 
58 per cent of PSP respondents and 54 per cent of PPR respondents seemed to worry about 
the survival of their parties. An even larger majority of all respondents was convinced that 
together they would exercise more influence than separately (92 per cent).  
 Ideological motives may have played an important role, too. About three-quarters of 
surveyed convention participants expected 'ideological renewal' from Green Left - most of all 
the Communists (83 per cent), least of all the Pacifist Socialists (57 per cent). The hope for 
renewal among Communists does not seem surprising after the collapse of 'real existing 
socialism' in Eastern Europe. More puzzling seems the 'conservative' attitude of the Pacifist 
Socialists; it might reflect an unshaken, if not dogmatic belief in a fairly coherent utopia - 
libertarian socialism - which distinguished them from Radicals and Evangelicals, who had 
never developed a coherent utopia, as well as from the Communists who had believed in 'real 
existing' rather than utopian socialism. Pacifist Socialists tended to reject 'realism', as 
indicated by statements like 'Politics is more a matter of getting the best possible out of a 
given situation than of strictly sticking to principles' (72 per cent disagreed; compare CPN 43 
per cent). This more dogmatic attitude of the PSP also throws some light on the question why 
the party tried to preserve its independence longer than the other three parties. Even at the 
convention in 1991 19 per cent of the PSP respondents opposed the merger, whereas 6 per 
cent of the EVP, 3 per cent of the PPR and only 2 per cent of the CPN respondents did so.  
 People who show little enthusiasm for ideological renewal or for Green Left as such, 
might be reluctant to embrace a new ideology like ecologism. The question has not been 
asked directly, as the term 'ecologism' does not have a  familiar ring in the Netherlands. 
Indirectly, the new ideology has been operationalised through statements about economic 
growth, pollution as the most important problem, the subordination of man to nature and the 
dilemma between protection of the environment and improvement for the lowest income 
groups (Table 3, items 2, 6, 7 and 8). 
 Though the statements seem to reflect the core of ecologism, as described in the literature 
(Dobson, 199, pp. 13-36; Simonnet 1982), they do not scale very well in our dataset.3 The 
four items are correlated only weakly (Table 4). If we use the items anyway, we find that the 
respondents who agreed most with all three items did not think more positively about the 
Green Left than others. 
 
Greening: On the four 'green items' PPR- and PSP-respondents scored significantly higher 
than the Communist respondents; with one exception: on the last item the CPN did better 
than the PPR – 68 per cent of its respondents felt that man exists for the benefit of nature - 
not exactly an orthodox Marxist point of view; however, the implications of this ecocentric 
statement may not have been fully grasped by all respondents.4 
 Sympathy for environmental groups such as Greenpeace or Defence of the Environment 
(Milieudefensie; similar to 'Friends of the Earth' in other countries) is very high among 
Communists, though not as high as among Radical or Evangelical respondents in our sample 
(Table 5). In fact, the EVP looked about as green as the PPR and greener than the PSP in our 
survey. Evangelical respondents also showed most sympathy for the marginal (pure) Green 
Party, another indicator for 'greenness'; Radicals expressed almost as much sympathy for De 
Groenen, whilst Communists and Pacifist Socialists were significantly cooler. 
 
Reddening: To indicate 'redness', questions were asked about sympathy for (marginal) 
Marxist parties, for trade unions and employers organisations; about the control of the state 
over major corporations and membership in NATO - the organisation which defends the 
capitalist world against communism.5 Besides, respondents were invited to place themselves 
on a ten-point scale from left to right. Communist and Pacifist Socialist respondents scored 
higher on these items than Radicals and Evangelicals - except when sympathy for the 
Socialist Party was concerned: PSP and CPN were more hostile towards this party, which has 
pursued populist, at times even sexist and ethnocentric policies. The PSP and CPN activists 
placed themselves further to the left than the PPR and EVP members (average scores: CPN: 
1.5, PSP: 1.6, PPR: 2.2, EVP: 2.8).  
 
Table 3  Ideology of Green Left. (Percentage of respondents agreeing – or agreeing 
strongly – with with the statements) (1991 surveys) 
 
Statements CPN PSP PPR EVP Total 
1. All major corporations should be 
controlled by the state 
2. Protection of the environment 
requires that even the lowest incomes 
should not be raised 
3. The Netherlands should leave NATO 
4. A basic income should be introduced 
for everyone within ten years 
5. Euthanasia by a physician should 
always be allowed if a patient so 
desires 
6. Nature does not exist for the benefit 
of man, man exists for the benefit of 
nature 
7. Should we strive for less or more 
economic growth to solve 
environmental problems such as 
pollution or shortage of raw 
materials1  





































































































problem in the Netherlands 21 31 49 35 35 * 
* Variance between parties significant at 1 per cent level or less 
1. Respondents could mark their position on a ten-point scale; the percentage in the table 
refers to those who had marked the first three positions closest to ‘less economic growth’. 
 
Post-materialism: Post-materialism, as measured by Inglehart's famous questions, seems 
quite popular in the Netherlands - and especially among supporters of PPR and PSP 
(Inglehart 1977; Van Deth 1985, pp. 189-197). Not surprisingly, in our samples 'materialists' 
were hard to find: merely 1 per cent gave priority to 'maintaining law and order' and to 
'fighting inflation' over 'increasing the say of citizens' and 'protecting the freedom of opinion'. 
Pure post-materialists, who rank the latter two items higher than the former two, made up 74 
per cent of our sample. 
 Surprisingly, Evangelical respondents seemed less 'post-materialist' than others – 
including Communists; but this may be explained in terms of age and education differences. 
Perhaps because of the skewed distribution, the 'post-materialism' index did not correlate 
very well with motivation for the merger. 
 
Social homogeneity: As expected, the four groups surveyed were highly educated and more 
often employed in public service or education than in the productive sector (trade, industry or 
agriculture). Yet there were significant differences between them - respondents from the New 
Left parties PSP and PPR being more educated and less often employed in the productive 
sector (Tables 6 and 7).  
 It might be interesting to compare the four Green Left parties with other Dutch parties as 
well as other green parties elsewhere. The data are not quite comparable, given differences in 
time and place. Thus the data about other Dutch parties were collected in 1978 and 1979, 
when education levels in the Netherlands were a little lower than in 1991. Even so, the 
observed differences are striking. University and college graduates dominated all party 
conventions, but were even more numerous at those of the Green Left parties than at those of 
Labour, Christian Democrats or VVD and only similar to D66, a liberal but also greenish 
party founded by intellectuals. Data about PvdA, CDA ans Liberals come from the European 
Middle Level Elites Project of 1978/1979 (Middel and Van Schuur 1981, p. 67). 
 
Table 4 Green statements (correlations) 
 
Statements          6    7    8 
2.  (Lowest incomes)        .07    .24**    .31**     
6.  (Man/nature)         -    .18*    .11   
7.  (Less economic growth)      -    -    .14*     
8.  (Pollution most important problem)    -    -    - 
* Significant at 5 per cent level 
**  Significant at 1 per cent level 
 
Table 5 Sympathy for social movements and other organizations (average scores on a 
scale from 0=extreme antipathy to 10=extreme sympathy  (1991 surveys))  
 
Organisations  CPN  PSP  PPR   EVP  Total 
FNV (Trade Unions) 7.8  6.7  7.2  6.5  7.2 
VNO (Employers) 2.4  2.2  3.3  3.2  2.8 
IKV (Peace)  6.8  6.5  8.0  8.0  7.3 
VMD (Environment) 7.8  8.5  8.9  8.5  8.4 







Table 6 Education levels of Dutch party delegates (Surveys of 1991, 1990 and 1978/1979) 
 
    CPN PSP PPR EVP GL* PvdA CDA Liberals 
Primary level  22  3  8 16   8  27 20  3 
Secondary level  15 11  8 20 12 13 19 29    
College/university 63 85 82 64 81 58 60 67 
* Green Left congress of 1990 
 
 Surveys of green party conferences in Belgium, Germany and Great Britain led to similar 
results: university and college graduates were clearly over-epresented (Kitschelt and 
Hellemans 1990, p. 100; Poguntke 1990, pp. 38-40; Rüdig et al. 1990, pp. 20-4). According 
to Alber (1989) and Bürklin (1984, 1985), green party activists are well-educated but under- 
or unemployed, hence frustrated. Our data do not really bear this out: more than two-thirds of 
all respondents held paid jobs (at least twenty hours a week), less than 15 per cent were 
unemployed (including the permanently ill or handicapped) or working less than twenty 
hours a week; the remaining 18 per cent were retired or working at home without pay 
(housewives or -men). Among the university or college graduates there were even fewer 
unemployed than among the less educated respondents. 
 Alber also expected over-representation of 'producers of services' and under-
representation of 'producers of goods' among green party activists (Alber 1989, p. 200). This 
hypothesis receives some support from our data: very few respondents worked in agriculture 
or industry, but many in private or public service (including education). In this respect they 
differ from the Labour party and Christian Democratic respondents of the 1978/1979 surveys, 
though not drastically (See Table 7).  
 At present it is difficult to test the hypothesis of Andersen (1990) and Lucardie (1980, 
1989) about the affinity between 'communicative workers' or 'logocrats' and New Left or 
green parties. An indication is provided, however, by the education area of the respondents. 
About one-quarter of the Pacifist Socialist and Radical respondents had received a degree in 
the social sciences or a related discipline (political science, psychology, possibly also social 
work); about the same proportion of Communist respondents had done so, but only 7 per cent 
of the Evangelicals. In the 1978/79 surveys, 11 per cent of the Labour party delegates, 8 per 
cent of the Christian Democrats and of D66 and only 5 per cent of the VVD delegates were 
social scientists. More 'technocratic' and 'bureaucratic' disciplines like (applied or pure) 
sciences or law were more common among the VVD, D66 and Christian Democrats, but rarer 
among Labour and the Green Left. 
 
Generations: The majority of all Green Left respondents were in their thirties and forties - 
but the same was true of Labour, Liberal and Christian Democratic respondents in the earlier 
surveys. There were significant differences between the Green left parties: whereas two-
thirds of the Pacifist Socialist respondents were born after 1950 (hence at most teenagers 
during the 1960s), 54 per cent of the Evangelical respondents was born before 1940 (hence 
already adults in the 1960s). To the '68 generation, if defined as people born between 1940 
and 1950, belonged less than one-third of all respondents - and only slightly more within the 
Radical and Communist contingents.  
 Though the hypothesis about generational homogeneity has to be rejected, it cannot be 
excluded that the Green Left activists shared relevant experiences, in the 1970s and 1980s, 
such as mass demonstrations.  
 
 
Table 7 Occupation of Dutch party delegates (Surveys of 1991, 1990, 1978 and 1979) 
 
Occupation  CPN PSP PPR EVP GL PvdA CDA VVD 
Agriculture and 
industry    8  2  6  8  5 14 14 18 
Transport, commerce 
private services    8 20 22 18 23 13 19 24 
Professions   6  6  2  7  5  3  7  7 
Public service and 
education   39 40 33 13 31 44 38 26 
Other branches  10 11 11 12 13  9 11  5 
No occupation  28 22 26 43 23 17 12 20 
(incl.students)   
    99%  101%  100%  101%  100%  100%  101%  100% 
 
Table 8 Green Left active in social movements (Percentage of respondents of each party 
reporting activities in:) 
 
Movement  CPN  PSP  PPR  EVP  Total 
Environmental    8  20  27  25  19 
Peace   17  26  21  26  22 
Women   13    3  10    2    8 
Labour   32  22  16  16  22 
N.B. Percentages do not add up to 100% as respondents may be active in more than one 
movement or in none at all.  
 
Social movements: As we have seen already, the Green Left activists in our survey showed 
considerable sympathy for social movements, especially the environmental movement 
(Greenpeace, Defence of the Environment), to a lesser extent also the peace movement (IKV: 
Inter-denominational Peace Council, linked to major churches, which initiated the mass 
actions against cruise missiles in the 1980s), Women's Liberation (Man-Woman-Society, 
mainly active in the late 1960s and 1970s) and the trade unions (Table 5). As expected, a 
majority of our respondents was active in one of these movements - though not a very large 
one (55 per cent). Most active proved the Communists, least active the Pacifist Socialists and 
the members of the EVP - unless we include the church in our list of movements: more than 
half the Evangelicals reported activities in a church group. 
 Even though most Green Left activists were active in a movement, they may never have 
met each other, as they often seemed to prefer often different movements (See Table 8). The 
CPN seems to deviate most from the mainstream Green Left. Communists were most active 
in the labour movement (trade unions, works councils or committees), Pacifist Socialists took 
to the peace movement, whereas Radicals preferred the environmental movement. The 
women's movement attracted only a few activists - probably because women were 
underrepresented in all Green Left parties, as well as in other Dutch parties. Women made up 
only 19 per cent of our EVP sample, 20 per cent of the PSP respondents, 30 per cent of our 
Communist sample and 32 per cent of the PPR group. Their (relatively) strong presence at 
the CPN congress may reflect the important contribution of feminists to the renewal of the 
party in the 1980s. 
 If we compare rank-and-file members at the conventions with executive members and 
parliamentary representatives, we find that the latter were more active than the former in the 
environmental movement, the peace movement and the labour movement (in the women's 
movement the numbers were too small). The differences were, however, only significant in 
the peace movement. Thus our hypothesis about the contribution of social movements to the 
formation of the Green Left should not be rejected, even if the evidence seems a little thin. 
 
Conclusions and Interpretations 
 
Organisations tend to merge when they – meaning their leaders - feel threatened by the 
environment (Caris, Clarijs and Nierman 1986, pp. 31-2). This general 'law' seems to apply to 
declining political parties, too, such as the CPN, EVP and to a lesser extent even PSP and 
PPR. Activists of the four parties, surveyed at their final party conventions, often mentioned 
the threat of the political environment - 'separately we will not survive' - as motive for their 
merger. Yet the purpose of the merger was not only the preservation of parliamentary seats 
but also an ideological renewal. The name of the new party, 'Green Left', as well as its 
manifesto suggested a new, in casu green ideology. 
 Our efforts to operationalize this ideology in our survey met, however, with limited 
success. A clear and consistent pattern of beliefs did not emerge. Three explanations can be 
offered for this lack of coherence: a) the respondents had different conceptions of green 
ideology from ours; b) the respondents agreed on every green item; c) the respondents had 
not yet given a great deal of thought to the new ideology . There may be some truth in all 
three. The first explanation cannot be verified here, of course, but requires other techniques 
such as in-depth interviews. The second explanation seems plausible, but only to some 
extent: there was agreement on some green items, but not on all. Strangely enough, most 
agreement existed on the statement 'nature exists not for the benefit of man, man exists for 
the benefit of nature', which was meant to differentiate between 'pure green' ecocentric 
ecologists and 'reddish green' anthropocentric eco-socialists (or  'deep' versus 'shallow 
ecologists'). Quite likely, the third explanation applies to this statement, which has been 
discussed among Dutch philosophers but probably not among party activists. 
 If we concentrate on the other green items, we find at least a weak pattern, more or less in 
the line of our expectations. Activists at the conventions of the PPR and EVP agreed more 
often with these items than delegates at the PSP congress and significantly more than 
delegates of the CPN. The 'greening' of the Communists may have started only recently and 
remained rather spotty. Nevertheless, the delegates at the CPN congress were eager to merge 
with the greener parties - which may explain why correlations between green items and 
motivation for the merger were quite low. Communists tended to think more pragmatically 
than Pacifist Socialists, Radicals and Evangelicals. 
 Perhaps they also hoped to 'redden the greens' within the Green Left. So far, the 
'reddening' process seems to have made some headway: practically all respondents in our 
surveys placed themselves on the left, if not extreme left; most of them showed more 
sympathy for trade unions than for employers; almost all of them want the Netherlands to 
quit NATO and a large number favours nationalisation of major corporations. Members from 
EVP and PPR however, objected to nationalisation.  
 Though there seems to be some ideological convergence between the constituent parties 
of the Green Left, there is still substantial divergence, too. Important issues such as a 
guaranteed basic income, euthanasia, priority of environmental problems over economic 
growth and the redistribution of incomes divide the parties. At best one could observe an 
'overlapping consensus', or cross-cutting cleavages which may prevent polarisation: on some 
issues the Communists take a minority position, on others the Evangelicals, the Radicals or 
the Pacifist Socialists. Even so, the latter two groups agree more than the others; in a way, 
they constitute the core of the Green Left - thus confirming our expectations about continuity 
between the New Left and the Green Left. The (limited) ideological convergence may have 
been supported by value consensus. Almost all surveyed activists ranked 'post-materialist' 
values higher than 'materialist' ones. The validity of the value index can, however, be 
questioned (see for instance Kreuzer 1990; Lowe and Rüdig 1986, pp. 515-20). 
 Another factor contributing to the rapprochement between 'reds' and 'greens' may be 
social homogeneity. The respondents in our survey did not quite meet our expectations in this 
respect. The typical New Left and green party activist should be university or college 
educated and unemployed or employed in education, if not in a social or cultural agency in 
the public sector. Most of our respondents met the first criterium; a large number, but not a 
majority, also the second and third. Unemployed university graduates constituted only a 
small minority, but teachers and (other) public servants were quite numerous, especially 
among the Communists and Pacifist Socialists. Social scientists - potential 'logocrats' - were 
also over-represented among those, whereas lawyers and (applied) scientists - potential 
'bureaucrats' and 'technocrats' - seemed under-represented, compared with other parties.    
 In a demographic sense, the Green Left proved fairly heterogeneous. In all parties men 
were over-represented, 7:3 or even 8:2. Differences were more substantial (and statistically 
significant) with respect to age. Hence we cannot say that the '68 generation (here defined as 
born between 1940 and 1950) dominates the new party. 
 Even if the Green Left activists did not share the same generational experience, they 
might share other significant experiences. Most of them were active in one or more social 
movements. They might not have joined the same organisations - Communists preferring the 
labour movement, Radicals the environmental movement - but possibly they have rubbed 
shoulders in mass demonstrations, such as the demonstrations against cruise missiles or 
nuclear power stations.  
 Thus the Dutch rapprochement between 'red' and 'green', Communists and Pacifist 
Socialists, Radicals and Evangelicals, cannot be explained completely in this chapter. 
Pragmatic electoral reasons, partial ideological convergence (overlapping consensus), partial 
social and cultural homogeneity and participation in social movements may all have 
contributed. At any rate, it has become difficult to disentangle 'red' and 'green' dimensions in 
the Dutch party system: they are neither complete opposites nor identical twins, but 
'quarreling cousins': sharing a similar leftist backgroun, but disagreeing about certain salient 
issues. Whereas the Old Left or ‘pure reds’(Communist especially) continue to favour 
economic growth as well as state control of the economy, the ‘pure greens’ (Evangelicals and 
Radicals, in the Dutch case) defend the latter but not the former. 
 This may be a general trend in Western Europe (De Roo 1991; Finger and Sciarini 1991; 
Lauber 1983; Kitschelt and Hellemans). As De Roo predicts, it could be a transitory stage; 
the 'reds' may die out and give way to 'greens' everywhere. In other words, the fifth scenario 
described in our introduction might become the most popular one, whilst the first one 
disappears and the others are taken by one or two countries only. Ideologies do not, however, 
die like human beings; some kind of socialism may survive the twentieth century anyhow and 










Appendix 1 List of Dutch parties mentioned in the chapter 
 
CDA Christen Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Appeal) resulted from the 
 merger of ARP, CHU and KVP in 1980. 
CPN Communistische Partij Nederland (Communist Party of the Netherlands) founded  in 1909 as Soci
D66 Democraten ’66 (Democrats ’66) founded in 1966; left-wing liberal party with 
 greenish leanings. 
EVP Evangelische Volkspartij (Evangelical People’s Party) founded in 1981 by left-
 wing Christian Democrats, joined Green Left and dissolved itself in 1991. 
GL Groen Links (Green Left) set up as an electoral alliance in 1989, became a political 
  party in 1990. 
PPR Politieke Partij Radikalen (Political Party of Radicals) founded in 1968 by radical 
members of the major Christian parties, joined Green Left and dissolved itself in 
1991. 
PSP Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij (Pacifist Socialist Party) founded in 1957, joined  
  Green Left and dissolved itself in 1991. 
PvdA Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party) resulted from a merger of Social Democrats 
 with other left-wing groups in 1946. 
VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and 





1  Funding was provided by the Dutch Foundation for Scientific Research (NWO). 
2  62 per cent at the Green Left congress (n1=482), 57 per cent at the convention of the CPN (n2=95), 55 per 
cent (n3=61) at the EVP, 60 per cent at the PPR (n4= 102), 61 per cent at the PSP (n5=65). The EVP seems 
over-represented in our survey, given its small  membership (see Table 2). 
3 The data have been tested with Mokken Scale analysis for Polychotomous items, a programme developed at 
the 'Dienstencentrum voor Informatieverwerking, Software ontwikkeling en Computer onderwijs' at the 
University of Amsterdam in 1989.  
4 The statement was a direct quote from the first draft of the Green Left Manifesto, published in 1990; it did not 
figure in the revised second draft of the manifesto, however, published in 1991.  
5 Admittedly, this interpretation can be contested. Liberals would insist that NATO defends freedom and 
democracy rather than capitalism; radical leftists would reply that NATO accepted members like Portugal and 
Turkey which did not meet common standards of freedom and democracy when they were admitted. Whatever the 
  
  
merit of these arguments, the radical leftist interpretation seems more relevant for our survey. A more serious 
objection may come from pacifists who would accept capitalism yet reject military organizations such as NATO. 
Yet in our sample agreement about leaving NATO correlates quite strongly with agreement about nationalization 
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